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Abstract 
Many libertarians, especially those inclined toward the Austrian school of 
economics, counter the market-failure justification for government 
intervention by denying any legitimacy whatsoever to the neoclassical 
concept of efficiency. But properly interpreted, neoclassical efficiency, 
rather than providing an open-ended justification for all sorts of 
government intervention, provides one of the most powerful and 
comprehensive objections to government coercion in general. 
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I. Introduction 
Many libertarians, as well as other free-market advocates, have 
extreme reservations about the welfare theory of neoclassical 
economics. They especially object to the derivative notion of market 
failure and the frequency with which it is employed to justify 
government intervention. When libertarian economist Bryan Caplan 
recently defended welfare economics and other aspects of 
neoclassical analysis from the criticisms of the Austrian school, he 
elicited an array of dissenting replies from such Austrians as Walter 
Block, Jörg Guido Hülsmann, and Edward Stringham. These critics 
utterly reject neoclassical efficiency as a coherent standard for 
comparing different outcomes in the real world. Indeed, Block has 
gone so far as to assert that “[t]here are no such things” as market 
failures.1 
∗ I have received helpful suggestions from Peter Boettke, Mark Brady, Christopher 
Coyne, Warren Gibson, David Henderson, Joseph Salerno, and Edward P. 
Stringham, but none of them bear any responsibility for the final outcome. 
1 Caplan (1999). The first round of critiques came from Block (1999) and 
Hülsmann (1999). Caplan (2001) replied, which inspired a further response from 
Block (2003). Although my article focuses on welfare economics, the debate 
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Caplan, in my opinion, has done a superb job of exposing the 
weaknesses of various Austrian alternatives to efficiency, but I believe 
that his defense of neoclassical welfare theory can be taken a step 
further. Going beyond philosophical debates about the ultimate 
validity of efficiency, I intend to demonstrate that market-failure 
justifications for government intervention are usually a misuse of this 
neoclassical standard. This brief comment strives to combine much 
of what has become standard fare among economists, some of 
Caplan’s points, and a few original insights into a comprehensive 
reappraisal of neoclassical welfare theory. Together they demonstrate 
that efficiency, properly interpreted, offers a far more encompassing 
rejection of government overall than is generally appreciated. 
II. The Proper Use of Neoclassical Welfare Economics 
Those inclined toward the Austrian school of economics often 
counter the market-failure justification for government intervention 
by denying any legitimacy whatsoever to the neoclassical concept of 
efficiency. See, for instance, Murray Rothbard’s classic article on 
welfare economics (1956).  The problem with this approach is that it 
throws out the baby with the bath water. Some standard of efficiency, 
however crude and whatever its shortcomings, stands implicitly 
behind Ludwig Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek’s socialist calculation 
critique of socialism. Without such a concept it would likewise be 
impossible to show that tariffs make economies poorer, and 
libertarians would be left with purely normative objections, 
completely divorced from any consideration whatsoever of net 
economic consequences.2 
extends to many additional issues as well. Stringham’s (2001) and Stringham and 
White’s (2004) criticisms of Caplan tend to emphasize the inability of judges to 
apply neoclassical welfare standards in court decisions, a conclusion I actually share 
but believe can be strongly substantiated within the neoclassical framework. The 
Block quotation comes from an online review (2007). 
2 Rothbard (1956), which contains his discussion of welfare economics, has been 
frequently reprinted. Mises (1951) and Hayek (1935) are the standard Austrian 
critiques of socialism, but see also David Ramsay Steele (1992) for a neoclassical 
twist on the critique. The Austrian economist Israel M. Kirzner (1973, ch. 6) offers 
a more subtle yet more equivocal critique of neoclassical welfare economics that 
rejects the efficiency standard yet essentially reintroduces the same concept under 
the rubric of “coordination.” Roy E. Cordato (1992) critiques Rothbard and 
basically embraces Kirzner’s approach, but changes the name of the standard again, 
from “coordination” to “catallactic efficiency.” An Austrian-based rejection of both 
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A few neo-Chicago economists go in the opposite direction, with 
ironically similar results. They imply that if you consider all 
opportunity costs, including transaction costs, then all actual 
outcomes in the real world are efficient. We therefore live, according 
to them, in the best of all possible worlds. This broad definition of 
efficiency (like the broad definition of self-interest that claims all 
conscious choices are self-interested) may be an informative 
tautology for certain questions. But it strips us of a positive standard, 
grounded in an objective if imperfect assessment of people’s 
preferences, for comparing economic outcomes.3 
Therefore I accept the usual neoclassical approach to market 
failure. In the pure-Pareto formulation, it asks the following question: 
Given factor endowments and people’s preferences, can an 
omniscient and benevolent bureaucrat god imagine any transaction 
that does not take place on the market even though it would make at 
least one person better off without making a single person worse off? 
If so, you have a market failure. Notice that this definition omits 
from consideration transaction costs: i.e., the opportunity costs of 
finding a trading partner, negotiating the deal, and monitoring its 
terms. Without some such cost, the transaction in question would 
obviously have taken place. Thus, all market failures – whether 
labeled public goods, externalities, asymmetric information, or 
something else – stem ultimately from positive transaction costs. The 
insight follows from the analysis of Ronald Coase.4 
Efficiency thereby becomes a positive standard against which we 
can compare market outcomes. Two further questions arise, one 
Rothbard and Cordato’s (but not Kirzner’s) approach to welfare economics is 
David L. Prychitko (1993), reprinted in Prychitko (2002). Tyler Cowen (1990) 
speculates about a historically based alternative to what he calls “Paretian welfare 
economics.” 
3 Notable examples include Donald Wittman (1995), George Stigler (1982), and 
Gary Becker (1982). 
4 Coase (1988) reprints his major contributions regarding this topic. Demsetz 
(1968, p.33-34) makes the same point regarding positive transaction costs and 
market failures. Boettke, Coyne, and Lesson (2007) offer an intriguing but 
ultimately talmudic challenge to the neo-Chicago position by making a distinction 
between neoclassical efficiency and what they call “political efficiency.” Their 
political efficiency simply incorporates transaction costs when evaluating 
government activities (rendering all political outcomes politically efficient) while 
being unclear about the status of transaction costs in evaluating the efficiency of 
private activities. 
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positive and one normative. The positive question is can government 
alleviate market failure and increase efficiency, and if so, how reliably 
and systematically. The normative question is should government do 
so, even if it can. Economics addresses the first question but cannot 
address the second. Many advocates of government intervention are 
willing to give up some efficiency for alternative goals, as are many 
libertarians. In much of what follows, I will concentrate on the 
practical question of what governments can and cannot do. 
On the one hand, inefficiency is pervasive in the real world 
because transaction costs are pervasive. Even the market’s slightest 
delay in arriving at general equilibrium is a market failure by this 
measure. Because the very existence of money is a disequilibria 
phenomenon, efficiency would require a Walrasian world of 
instantaneous, computerized, zero-cost barter in which one good 
might serve as a numeraire for all prices but never serve as a medium 
of exchange. On the other hand, efficiency is also an abstract 
optimum, comparing an actual outcome with a superior but non-
existent one. There is no guarantee that a market failure, once 
identified, can be corrected. Any claim that government can alleviate 
market failure hinges on coercion’s ability to reduce transaction costs 
somehow. 
Why does neoclassical efficiency put transaction costs into a 
separate, privileged category from all other costs? Essentially two 
reasons. The first relates to the history of economic thought. These 
are the costs usually assumed to be close to zero in models of perfect 
competition and in Walrasian general-equilibrium analysis. But a 
second, more fundamental reason exists to treat transaction costs as 
special. They are the only costs that an involuntary transaction might 
potentially lower. All other costs, such as alternative uses of scarce 
factors or the foregone utility of leisure, cannot be reduced by 
coercion under any logically conceivable circumstances. But the 
prisoners’ dilemma illustrates a general case in which it is at least 
theoretically possible that a compulsory transaction makes all parties 
better off, according to their own subjective preferences. Whether 
this theoretical possibility can be translated into a practical reality is, 
of course, another question. 
If government coercion were confined to pure Pareto 
improvements, in which no party was made worse off according to 
his or her own preferences, it is hard to imagine that it could ever 
alleviate market failure. Any involuntary net transfer would be ruled 
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out. Unfortunately, then abolition of patently inefficient government 
regulations will rarely improve efficiency either. Repealing a tariff 
normally involves as many transfers imposing one; only a repeal that 
fully compensated all the losers qualifies as a pure Pareto 
improvement. I am therefore perfectly willing to admit interpersonal 
utility comparisons, even though the Austrians are correct that they 
can never be empirically verified. Comparisons can take either the 
form of Kaldor-Hicks (ex post) improvements or the more 
satisfactory but less commonly acknowledged Marshall (ex ante) 
improvements advocated by David Friedman. In most (but not all) 
situations, these two, more relaxed standards arrive at identical 
conclusions.5 
Even allowing for transfers where (with interpersonal utility 
comparisons) the gains exceed the losses, we should not view market 
failure as a blanket justification for all sorts of government coercion. 
Instead, market failure remains a rigorously narrow criterion. Only if 
you can demonstrate a market failure is it even theoretically 
conceivable that government coercion can generate any net benefits. 
Government coercion can always paternalistically impose one 
person’s preferences on another (as with drug laws and laws against 
prostitution) or redistribute resources from one person to another (as 
with welfare). But without some market failure, it is logically 
impossible for coercive intervention ever to make people better off 
generally. End of discussion. 
Government therefore devotes a lot of resources to finding 
market failures it might fix, and a large number of economists, 
unsurprisingly, respond to this incentive. A dubious development 
along these lines is the theoretical work attempting to show, with 
such concepts as merit goods and others, that much blatant 
government redistribution or paternalism in fact corrects some 
hitherto unnoticed market failure. Government coercion, in these 
alleged instances, rather than merely making one person better off at 
the expense of another, as seems apparent, is surreptitiously 
generating net benefits. I remain skeptical of such claims, which only 
obscure the precision of the market-failure criterion and back us into 
5 Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939), and Scitovsky (1941). See particularly Friedman’s 
neglected micro text (1990, p.434-54). Situations in which the Marshallian and 
Kaldor-Hicks standards can diverge are discussed in Friedman (1988) and Cowen 
(1993). 
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the neo-Chicago world in which all government coercion magically 
becomes efficient.6 
Excluding questionable market failures, the concept can still 
justify much government intervention in theory. But only if we take 
what Harold Demsetz uncharitably describes as the “nirvana” 
approach to public policy, which assumes that, once economists have 
identified a market failure, the government can correct it. In fact, 
omniscient and benevolent bureaucrat gods do not exist. If instead 
we compare the real-world market not with our ideal government but 
with real-world governments, many of the same transaction costs that 
make solving market failure difficult for market participants also 
afflict government. Utopia is not an option. Economists face a choice 
between two inefficient alternatives: the market and government 
(Demsetz, 1969). 
Such an exercise in comparative institutions reveals that 
government encounters two obstacles in alleviating market failure: 
the knowledge problem and the incentive problem. The knowledge 
problem involves more than simply identifying a market failure. In 
addition, government must often have some way of estimating, 
however crudely, the efficient optimum. Otherwise it could easily 
exacerbate the inefficiency. Air pollution is no doubt a negative 
externality that results in too much production. (Or clean air is a 
public good that is underproduced.) But how can any economist 
estimate the optimal level of pollution (or clean air) without some 
market in which people reveal their preferences? Surely some 
estimate is necessary in order to set the level of Pigovian taxes.7 
6 Perhaps the first economist to argue that redistribution alleviated a market failure 
was Lester Thurow (1971, 1973). For a primarily empirical defense of the efficiency 
of income redistribution, see the popular works of Robert H. Frank (1985, 1999), 
which build on arguments made more rigorously in Fred Hirsch (1976). On the 
other hand, Amartya K. Sen (particularly 1973, ch.1; 1992, p.136-43; most formally, 
1970, p.74-77, 196-99; but also 1982 and 1987), a strong advocate of coercive 
redistribution, concludes that such policies cannot be grounded solely in individual 
utility. Thus, he disparages neoclassical welfare analysis but for the opposite reason 
as do some libertarian Austrians: i.e,, because it can justify too little government 
intervention rather than too much. Sen, however, appears to accept the widespread 
illusion that the Hicks-Kaldor criterion actually dispenses with interpersonal utility 
comparisons. 
7 In personal conversations Caplan has provisionally challenged the distinction 
between the knowledge and the incentive problems, suggesting that lack of 
knowledge must result from a lack of incentives to discover it. I remain 
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The second obstacle, the incentive problem, is of course the 
subject of public-choice theory. It reminds us that we cannot assume 
that government will improve efficiency, even should economists 
know precisely how to do so. Government may not respond to a 
market failure at all; it may respond at a cost that exceeds benefits; or, 
in what amounts to the same thing, its response may over-correct so 
that the result decreases efficiency rather than increasing it. National 
defense, for instance, benefits the special interests that President 
Eisenhower identified as the military-industrial complex, and 
governments therefore tend to provide too much of it. Whether the 
U.S. government specifically does so is controversial, but we can 
know with absolute certainty that some governments must be 
overproviding what is called national defense; otherwise the service 
would not be needed in the first place. The overprovision is often a 
significant net loss of efficiency not only in the country “defended” 
but in other countries its government threatens.8 
Together the knowledge and incentive problems significantly 
circumscribe when government intervention can or will reduce 
transaction costs. Coercion by its nature cannot reliably and 
systematically address market failure. In other words, only rarely does 
government generate any net gains, making people better off on 
average. Most of its activities instead benefit some people at the 
expense of others (as evaluated subjectively by the individuals 
affected) though redistribution or paternalism. This distinguishes 
government from the free market, which routinely generates net 
gains even when not perfectly efficient. Admittedly, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that government coercion might enhance 
efficiency sometimes, just as we cannot rule out the possibility that 
private coercion wielded by common criminals might reduce 
transaction costs and enhance efficiency sometimes. Yet, few would 
consider this a persuasive argument for celebrating or encouraging 
criminal activity. 
unconvinced, but even if we accept this semantic unification, distinguishing 
between incentive problems relating to knowledge and other incentive problems 
would still be analytically useful to economists, for reasons similar to the useful 
distinction between transaction costs and all other opportunity costs. 
8 Kenneth E. Boulding (1963) first made the point about national defense. The 
most comprehensive introductory guide to public-choice literature remains Dennis 
C. Mueller (2003). 
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But the incentive problem cuts much deeper. Rather than 
applying only on a case-by-case basis, it raises profound across-the-
board questions about the very structure of government. Let us grant 
for a moment that government has both the knowledge and the 
incentive to fix some individual market failures. Once it has the 
power to act in those situations, what conceivable incentive structure 
can confine its coercion to those cases alone? How do you prevent 
government from also using that power in ways that are inefficient or 
otherwise undesirable? The government of Nazi Germany, to take an 
extreme example, probably alleviated some genuine market failures. 
But was the overall package worth it? Perhaps this problem should be 
separated into a third category all its own: the structural or 
constitutional. 
We do not have to rely on such egregious examples as Nazi 
Germany to illustrate the structural or constitutional aspect of the 
incentive problem. Consider the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
Over its long history it no doubt constructed some dams, given their 
public-goods features, that increased efficiency. But we also know 
that the inefficient subsidies or environmental damage wrought by 
other dams it built have recently inspired serious discussions on 
whether to tear them down. These losses are on top of the enormous 
transfers that building the dams imposed on displaced populations. 
Faced with the polar options of no Army Corps dams or all of them, 
which would have left the American people better off on net? 
Moreover, the default position would appear to be no dams, if we are 
not certain beyond a reasonable doubt that all the dams together, 
both efficient and inefficient, bring net gains. 
The structural or constitutional problem underscores the stark 
reality that government is a major source of additional inefficiency – 
on top of any market failures or other inefficiencies resulting from 
private behavior. Because government can just as easily cause as cure 
inefficiency, limiting government becomes an excellent way to make 
economic outcomes more efficient. But unfortunately, this goal itself 
faces significant transaction costs. Improvements in the policies or 
structure of government are generally non-excludable, giving rise to 
potential free riders. Therefore, such improvements are public goods, 
woefully underprovided. Put another way, the level and frequency of 
tax repeals is suboptimal. 
So far, we have considered only changing people’s incentives as a 
way to reduce inefficiency. Another way is changing people’s 
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preferences, not about the ultimate goods they wish to consume but 
about the means appropriate for the attainment of such 
consumption. Sometimes people do not free ride, even when they 
can easily get away with doing so, either out of altruism, civic virtue, 
or some other internalized morality. This is an obvious empirical 
observation, now supported by a vast amount of scholarly literature 
(too numerous and well known to require citing) either confirming or 
attempting to explain it. Witness the amounts of tipping and voting 
in the United States, both of which flout the free-rider assumption. 
Because of such ethical or ideological preferences, people sometimes 
surmount transaction costs and improve efficiency, either directly on 
the market or indirectly by limiting government. 
Relying upon preferences will no more yield perfect efficiency 
than will relying on market incentives or on government policy. Yet, 
this option reveals an inner contradiction in looking to government 
to correct market failures. If transaction costs such as the free-rider 
problem are decisive obstacles, a strictly limited government might be 
necessary to solve some market failures, but is unattainable. If 
transaction costs are not decisive, a strictly limited government 
becomes attainable but no longer necessary. The fact that people 
eschew the free-rider incentive to limit government coercion implies 
that they can also eschew the free-rider incentive to provide 
themselves market efficiency voluntarily.9 
III. Conclusion 
Government cannot correct market failure reliably or 
systematically. In fact, it is a major source of inefficiency. Thus, the 
neoclassical concept of efficiency, rather than providing an open-
ended justification for all sorts of government intervention, instead 
provides one of the most powerful and comprehensive objections to 
government coercion in general. 
References 
Becker, Gary. 1983. “A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups 
for Political Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(3): 317–400. 
Block, Walter. 1999. “Austrian Theorizing: Recalling the Foundations.” 
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2(Winter): 21–39. 
9 I have previously made this argument in Hummel (1987 and 1990). 
128 J. R. Hummel / The Journal of Private Enterprise 24(1), 2008, 119-130 
Block, Walter. 2003. “Realism: Austrian vs. Neoclassical Economics, Reply 
to Caplan.” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 6(Fall): 63–76. 
Block, Walter. 2007. “The Trouble with Democracy.” LewRockwell.com, 
August 25. http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block84.html. 
Boettke, Peter J., Christopher J. Coyne, and Peter T. Leeson. 2007. “Saving 
Government Failure Theory from Itself: Recasting Political Economy 
from an Austrian Perspective.” Constitutional Political Economy, 18(June): 
127–143. 
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1963. “The World War Industry as an Economic 
Problem.” In Disarmament and the Economy, ed. Kenneth E. Boulding and 
Emile Benoit, 3–27. New York: Harper & Row. 
Caplan, Bryan. 1999. “The Austrian Search for Realistic Foundations.” 
Southern Economic Journal, 65(April): 823–838. 
Caplan, Bryan. 2001. “Probability, Common Sense, and Realism: A Reply to 
Hülsmann and Block.” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 
4(Summer): 69–86. 
Coase. R. H. 1988. The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Cordato, Roy E. 1992. Welfare Economics and Externalities in an Open Ended 
Universe: A Modern Austrian Perspective. Boston: Kluwer Academic. 
Cowen, Tyler. 1990. “What a Non-Paretian Welfare Economics Would 
Have to Look Like.” In Economics and Hermeneutics, ed. Donald C. 
Lavoie, 285–298. London: Routledge. 
Cowen, Tyler. 1993. “The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty.” 
Economics and Philosophy, 9: 253–69. 
Demsetz, Harold. 1968. “The Cost of Transacting.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 82(February): 33–53. 
Demsetz, Harold. 1969. “Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint.” 
Journal of Law and Economics, 12(April): 1–3. 
Frank, Robert H. 1985. Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest 
for Status. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Frank, Robert H. 1999. Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of 
Excess. New York: Free Press. 
Friedman, David D. 1988. “Does Altruism Produce Efficient Outcomes? 
Marshall vs Kaldor.” Journal of Legal Studies, 17(January): 1–13. 
J. R. Hummel / The Journal of Private Enterprise 24(1), 2008, 119-130 129 
Friedman, David D. 1990. Price Theory: An Intermediate Text. 2nd ed. 
Cincinnati: South-Western. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von (ed.). 1935. Collectivist Economic Planning: Critical 
Studies on the Possibilities of Socialism. London: G. Routledge & Sons. 
Hicks, John R. 1939. “The Foundations of Welfare Economics.” Economic 
Journal, 49(December): 696–712. 
Hirsch, Fred. 1976. Social Limits to Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Hülsmann, Jörg Guido. 1999. “Economic Science and Neoclassicalism.” 
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 2(Winter): 3–20. 
Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. 1987. “Epstein’s Takings Doctrine and the Public-
Goods Problem.” Texas Law Review, 65(May): 1233–42. 
Hummel, Jeffrey Rogers. 1990. “National Goods Versus Public Goods: 
Defense, Disarmament, and Free Riders.” Review of Austrian Economics, 
4: 88–122. 
Kaldor, Nicholas. 1939. “Welfare Propositions of Economics and 
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Economic Journal, 49(September): 
549–52. 
Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Mises, Ludwig von. 1951. Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Mueller, Dennis C. 2003. Public Choice. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Prychitko, David L. 1993. “Formalism in Austrian-School Welfare 
Economics: Another Pretense of Knowledge?” Critical Review, 7(Fall): 
567–92. 
Prychitko, David L. 2002. Markets, Planning and Democracy: Essays after the 
Collapse of Communism. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Rothbard, Murray. 1956. “Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare 
Economics.” In On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays in Honor of Ludwig 
von Mises, ed. Mary Sennholz, 224–262. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand. 
Scitovsky, Tibor de. 1941. “A Note on Welfare Propositions in 
Economics.” Review of Economic Studies, 9(November): 77–88. 
Sen, Amartya K. 1970. Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: 
Holden-Day. 
 
130 J. R. Hummel / The Journal of Private Enterprise 24(1), 2008, 119-130 
Sen, Amartya K. 1973. On Economic Inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sen, Amartya K. 1982. Choice, Welfare, and Measurement. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Sen, Amartya K. 1987. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: B. Blackwell. 
Sen, Amartya K. 1992. Inequality Re-examined. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Steele, David Ramsay. 1992. From Marx to Mises: Post-Capitalist Society and the 
Challenge of Economic Calculation. LaSalle, Ill: Open Court. 
Stigler, George. 1982. The Economist as Preacher and Other Essays. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Stringham, Edward. 2001. “Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of 
Central Planning.” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 4(Summer): 
51–40. 
Stringham, Edward, and Mark D. White. 2004. “Economic Analysis of Tort 
Law: Austrian and Kantian Perspectives.” In Law and Economics: 
Alternative Economic Approaches to Legal and Regulatory Issues, ed. Margaret 
Oppenheimer and Nicholas Mercuro, 374–392. New York: M.E. 
Sharpe. 
Thurow, Lester C. 1971. “The Income Distribution as a Pure Public 
Good.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(May): 327–36. 
Thurow, Lester C. 1973. “The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good: 
A Response.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(May): 316–19. 
Wittman, Donald. 1995. The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political 
Institutions Are Efficient. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
